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RESEARCH NOTE
Effective maritime cybersecurity regulation – the case for a
cyber code
Rory Hopcraft and Keith M. Martin
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK
ABSTRACT
Ships and ports are increasingly connected to each other through
cyberspace. This connectivity streamlines many aspects of
maritime business, but also exposes maritime operators and
administrations to new types of risk including hacking and
outage. The maritime industry has been slow to realize the
implications of this new environment within which it operates,
and now lags behind other industries (like aviation) when it
comes to cyber risk mitigation and regulation. We argue that the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), alongside its members,
urgently needs to create robust and resilient cybersecurity
regulations. We suggest that the IMO should consider creating a
standalone Cyber Code, based on a framework created by
previous IMO Codes such as the Polar Code. Since the IMO uses
Codes as a legally binding instrument, this would help to ensure
the continued safety and efficiency of the maritime industry in the






industry; port security; risk
management
Background
Over the last decade, the world maritime industry has amplified its reliance on cyber-
enabled technology (IMO, 2017a). This technology has been used to increase both the
safety and productivity of maritime activities, including the remote monitoring of
vessels. However, this technology has simultaneously opened up the maritime industry
to new risks from cyberspace in its efforts to safeguard vessels and cargoes. These risks
range from unintentional human errors to ensuring software and data integrity to
planned state-level attacks. This situation is exacerbated by integrated information tech-
nology and the intensification in communication between ships and land-based entities,
which opens up many more methods in which a ship at sea could be exposed to a threat
from the cyber-realm.
Within the maritime sector, the adoption of cyber-enabled technology has occurred
incrementally over time, so the industry has been relatively slow to implement effective
risk mitigation and appreciate the extent to which ships and ports need to be kept up-
to-date in dealing with cyberspace (Latarche, 2018). The International Maritime Organiz-
ation (IMO), the specialized United Nations (UN) body charged with facilitating
cooperation to achieve the practicable standards of maritime security and regulate
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shipping, has also been late and somewhat inactive in considering regulation when it
comes to a number of cybersecurity standards.
While full digitalization of ships and related systems is a global risk-management issue,
it is of high significance to the Indo-Pacific region, which incorporates the third largest of
the world’s oceans and acts as the gateway to many of the major shipping lanes, straits
and canals, including the Suez Canal. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region experi-
enced the rise of a number of non-traditional security threats including piracy between
2008 and 2013 (IMO, 2017b). This spike was attributed to an increase in the financial
value of cargoes transiting the area, being led by strong demands for imports of crude
oil to both India and China, and the export of petroleum products (UNCTAD, 2017). So
while maritime security does remain a high priority in a variety of ways, the expanded
nature of security threats no longer entails only physical attacks by pirates and other crim-
inal groups on the water itself. Security decisions must also deal with the digitization in the
maritime industry that involves attacks on cyber-enabled ships by cybercriminals and a
growing myriad of hostile state and non-state actors.
A cumulative body of literature has documented how maritime systems are vulnerable
to an ever-growing range of cyber threats that can cause considerable damage (BIMCO,
2017; IET, 2016; TRANSAS, 2016). Malicious attacks on maritime systems have come
about through many points of vulnerability due to not taking necessary steps for cyber
security mitigation and preparedness, including poor access control to communications
systems and manipulation of employees (social engineering). The consequences of
these types of issues have been varied, including extortion, the loss or compromise of
business sensitive information and the opportunistic criminal disruption of chart naviga-
tion systems (Kelion, 2018). Yet with both ports and vessels moving towards systems of
automation and connectivity, the security of a modern-day vessels will need to ensure sig-
nificant security improvements to address ongoing issues like ransomware attacks and
cyber-sabotage. Such security concerns need to be assessed within the reality of globally
accessible navigation systems and the fact that the operation of modern technology-
dependent vessels are configured in ways that can invite these types of cyber-incidents.
In short, multiple systems may be connected together. It is therefore imperative that
the maritime industry, through the IMO, creates actionable, robust and resilient cyberse-
curity regulations that reflect this technological revolution. New regulations and guide-
lines are vital to progress towards a less vulnerable infrastructure as well as allowing
the maritime industry space to improve efficiency and decrease costs, without heedlessly
comprising the safety and security of the seafarer. At the very least, navigation and associ-
ated digital communication will continue to indispensably buttress the maritime sector,
improving the technology that supports activities such as international shipping, cruising,
leisure boating and marine scientific exploration
This research paper will outline some of the central challenges in the development of
robust maritime cybersecurity regulations. It will argue that there is a need to embed an
appropriate risk management regime via capacity-building and the advance and cham-
pioning of global cyber-security standards. We will also address how a collaborative
approach by the maritime industry can help to bring about a sense of renewed urgency
to ensure more formal process in establishing a self-reinforcing Cyber Code with
respect to maritime cyber-security.
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The maritime cybersecurity challenge
Discussing and implementing a broad-based cybersecurity strategy is a demanding task in
any fast-moving, multi-cultural and multi-lingual environment. There are several core
issues that make cybersecurity issues for the maritime industry especially complicated.
First is the linkage between on-board and terrestrial systems. The IMO is a ‘competent
international organization’ according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) (UN, 1982), meaning they are charged with the adoption of international
shipping rules and standards in matters concerning maritime safety and efficiency (IMO,
2014a). UNCLOS is explicitly targeted at the world’s oceans and seas, which places obli-
gations on and gives responsibilities to coastal and non-coastal states. However, much
of the infrastructure that enable communication is land-based, outside of the IMO’s
direct jurisdiction. This land-sea infrastructure interdependence is only set to strengthen
over the coming decade, either through the building of remotely monitored or fully auton-
omous unmanned ships without human intervention on-board.
Second, there are many different classes of vessel, all of which operate in dissimilar
environments. These vessels tend to have different computer systems built into them.
These systems will vary greatly depending on their class, use, and working environment.
And each vessel class, as defined by the Classification Societies, has specific requirements
for on-board systems. Notably, vessels are frequently designed with an operational life
expectancy of over 25 years (IMO, 2005, p. 57) and a vessel may be re-purposed several
times during its lifetime. So it is not uncommon for vessels to contain shipboard computer
networks and systems that are badly out-dated and that are predisposed to cyber-attacks
(Jones, Tam, & Papadaki, 2016).
A third complexity is that many ships habitually carry specialist equipment which was
not designed with cybersecurity in mind. Some of the aging operational technology
found on vessels have been demonstrated to be inherently unreliable and insecure,
such as the maritime navigational aids GPS and ECDIS, (Kelion, 2018; University of
Texas at Austin, 2013). This is despite being mandated by the IMO and designed in
accordance with international standards. To complicate matters, there are many
different equipment providers, meaning each vendor can implement security protec-
tions in their own particular way, making the harmonizing of equipment requirements
with existing cybersecurity standards adopted by other sectors problematic. Moreover,
some systems need to be publicly accessible, for example, if they are required for iden-
tifying and locating a vessel in distress and that is threatened by serious and/or immi-
nent danger.
Finally, a wide range of third-party service providers are employed by maritime oper-
ators in order to maintain and update a vessel’s operational systems. Contractor visits
occur when a vessel is in port, which limits the time for conducting the necessary work
required to take appropriate action to protect key assets. It is perfectly possible that a
ship’s crew have little understanding of how on-board systems interact with each other.
This might comprise of back-up and restore systems that are necessary for shipping oper-
ations or services if impaired. Frequently changing crew patterns also increase the chance
that installed systems are operated by individuals who are unfamiliar with them, increas-
ing the risk of user error and poor real-time management of security breaches and inci-
dents. These risk operation problems will be exacerbated when the vessel is at high sea
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and the only immediate support available is via limited and low-speed bandwidth connec-
tions (ESC Global Security, 2015).
A community based approach to regulation building
Given both the increasing sophistication of global cyber-attacks and the enhanced digitiz-
ation in shipping, the issue of maritime cybersecurity regulation requires urgent attention.
One part of this process involves the establishment of appropriate conventions and work-
able principles. As such, it is vital that the process of establishing robust and resilient mar-
itime cybersecurity regulations is done through international collaboration, and in a
manner that respects both regional needs and mutual economic dependencies. These
regulations must also address interdependencies and relationships between systems at
a data or information level
The impact of a threat to security to act as a catalyst to the creation and implementation
of a regulatory security architecture is not a new concept within the maritime space. Glück
(2015) suggests that threats like piracy have acted as a vehicle for the accelerated pro-
duction of transnational collectives to improve maritime security relations and sub-
sequently have led to the creation of security communities (Bueger, 2015). Based on an
assessment of the risk, these communities share knowledge and develop a common
understanding of problems and opportunities through socialization. These convergent
communities can then support shared practices and habits that aim to promote posi-
tive-sum and profitable elements, such as reducing logistics costs and ‘frictionless’ ship-
ping that removes the need for a customs border (while still suppressing undesirable,
often counter-productive or illegal, activity).
Both the EU and UN are examples of international security communities that have come
to share common norms of behavior and acted to and institutionalize new platforms for
mutual engagement, based on, for instance, law-bound standards of police and govern-
ment conduct. So too is NATO, for instance, whose Operation Ocean Shield in 2009 was
mandated – in full accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – to con-
tribute to international efforts to counter maritime piracy and to support efforts like joint
surveillance with regional governments (NATO, 2016). Such capacity building missions
included the building of training centers as well as developing relationships between
the defence and commercial sector. Overall, collaborating through supranational organiz-
ations does allow for drafting of shared strategy documents that, over time, can support
specific mandates to strengthen international and regional security initiatives.
Furthermore, security concerns on land can act as a precondition for a more systematic
approach incorporating wider maritime security issues (Remuss, 2010). International
support can be given to help coastal states think about how to best support safe and
secure shipping and set up their navies and coastguards that are tailored to specific mar-
itime needs.
While not a stand-alone solution to the maritime security threats, the IMO can act as a
platform for the international maritime community to monitor compliance and mitigate
cyber risks. All IMO regulatory discussions are conducted through its membership which
has a vast range of expertise and proficiencies. The Djibouti Code of Conduct is one
example of how the IMO, through collaborative work has helped in the fight against
piracy in the Indian Ocean. It was signed in 2009 and then later revised in 2017. Involving
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more than 20 states, alongside with regional stakeholders, the Code provides an example
of how the IMO used its expertise and power to initiate the establishment of multi-agency,
multidisciplinary maritime security partnerships. This institutional framework, where poss-
ible, coordinates military and civilian resources to avoid duplication and strengthens trans-
regional coordination such as facilitating the operational coordination of regional navies.
Cyber-security however, cannot be approached through a limited regional oceanic
network of like-minded actors. Due to the unique nature and scope of maritime
systems and digital infrastructure, the impacts and detrimental flow-on effects of an
attack are not limited to just one region or domain. The far-reaching impacts of the
cyber-attack on A.P. Moller-Maersk in 2017, highlights the importance of international col-
laborative approaches to addressing cybersecurity threats. This attack started on an office
terminal in Ukraine, spread through the company’s global network, and eventually
impacted international port terminals including those in India (Saul, 2017).
Nonetheless, regional stakeholders are still important to regulatory discussions, as they
are more acutely aware of the immediate geopolitical, environmental, resource and
related issues for a particular region. The Indian Ocean is one of the major conduits for
Middle Eastern oil transport, and therefore its shipping lanes are predominantly used by
tankers, which carry their own specific risks. Also, as was seen by the worldwide impli-
cations of a 2017 ransomware attack – WannaCry through the Windows XP operating
system – there are some states who lack the capability to easily implement updated tech-
nical mitigation processes (AFP, 2017). Problematically, this lack of capacity will inhibit
their ability to co-ordinate with non-government stakeholders and met stringent regulat-
ory compliance.
So maritime cybersecurity is an inter-dependent global challenge, tackled by a compre-
hensive strategic framework of international collaboration, feedback, coordination and
communication in order to achieve common or complementary risk analysis. The creation
of a stronger shared understanding of both the risks and impacts of a cyber-attack will
allow the formation of a cross-sectoral security community, focused on cybersecurity
and associated threats to operation-critical, technology platforms such as navigation
systems. It is through standardization and certification that all relevant regional and inter-
national stakeholders will be able to better assist with incident management as well as
acting to ensure the development of adaptable regulation, which is then monitored
and evaluated by all within the sector.
The role of codes in the IMO
The IMO uses a mixture of conventions and codes to enforce regulation and best practices
to ensure safe and efficient shipping. The IMO’s main legal basis is given by the Safety of
Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) (IMO, 2014c), which is legally binding to any vessel within
certain parameters. By appending regulations to SOLAS, the IMO can adapt and modernize
its requirements as technology develops. Any amendments to these conventions continue
to be legally binding under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969) (UN, 1980).
Codes within the IMO are normally viewed as guidelines unless they are mandated
under a precise convention. Codes create standalone guidance and regulation that is
specific to one certain aspect of the maritime industry. For example, the International
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Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), which outlines regulation that
applies only to vessels operating in polar waters, has mandatory sections that are enforce-
able under both SOLAS and maritime pollution conventions.
By using Codes, the IMO can highlight long-term and specific risks that are unique to a
process or environment that the code pertains too. It creates an unambiguous reference to
how the overarching conventions still apply, regardless of the uniqueness of a process or
environment. The Polar Code outlines the requirements on safety equipment, such as life
jackets and ice axes, that are distinctive to the operational environment and that are
required to ensure continued compliance with SOLAS. In other words, as well as reiterating
requirements, Codes allow additional requirements, above and beyond the basic require-
ments of compliance to be added to the overarching convention. The Polar Code outlines
stringent hull specifications that vessels wishing to be classified as ‘Icebreakers’ require.
Such a classification applies to ships constructed of steel and intended for independent
navigation in ice-infested polar waters. This then allows the IMO to restrict the scope of
aspects of compliance, to specific practices and process when required.
The use of Codes also allows for the harmonization of the different and discrete rules
that regulate shipping. Again, taking the Polar Code, it creates a consistent regulatory fra-
mework that incorporates parts of both IMO frameworks and those of the Arctic Council
(Bai, 2015). This allows other administrations’ requirements, local authority law and exper-
tise all to be incorporated into wider IMO regulations and standards. Such a uniform
approach ensures there is no unfair advantage given to ships under certain adminis-
trations (Schröder-Hinrichs & Hebbar, 2006).
Additionally, this harmonization occurs between the various councils that form the IMO.
It allows each council to use their technical expertise to develop holistic regulations through
a better decision-making process. Through the use ofworking groups, each council will con-
sider regulation and guidance that ensure the reduction of the risks present in relevant
specific environments, such as in known regions of high piracy. These recommendations
are then collated under the IMO parent committee, normally the Maritime Safety Commit-
tee, to develop a single code that includes all the recommendations.
Codes allow a wide and varied IMO membership (via its member states, various think
tanks, shipping associations and Non-Governmental Organizations) to share their exper-
tise and experiences to the decision-making process. This collaboration is aided by Ship-
ping Associations who work on behalf of smaller bodies that do not have their own seats
within IMO discussions. This means that the smaller parties, that are the practitioners
within the maritime community, can have a sense of ownership among all actors as
their interests feed into an equally-beneficial governance process. This allows the
decision-making process to consider not only the broader industry risks, but also the
more nuanced risks that only a specific section of the industry might face. Codes thus
facilitate information sharing, promote engagement within the maritime community,
encourage greater awareness among public stakeholders, and ensure a better co-ordi-
nated decision making process to support relevant cross-sector maritime regulation.
The case for a cyber code
There is no one regulation or standard for maritime systems and cyber security. And as
discussed earlier, maritime cybersecurity poses a unique set challenges for regulators to
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consider. The establishment of a Cyber Code is needed to speed up the development of
cyber security standards and support effective and holistic maritime cyber risk
management.
Overcoming system complexities
Vessel and port systems are complex and differ vessel to vessel, therefore it is vital that the
IMO draw together all the relevant security assurance regulations. This ensures that oper-
ators are aware that even when cyber is not explicitly mentioned, it might still be relevant
to a specific regulation.
A Code would allow the harmonization of these numerous regulations into one succinct
benchmark document, which is easier to monitor and enforce. In general terms, cyberse-
curity management encompasses a wide variety of regulations already in place, including
navigational aids, operating systems and ballast water systems. A standalone Cyber Code
would allow the IMO to draw attention to these systems, which are universal across
vessels, and ensure the operators and crew are fully aware of existing vulnerabilities
and the wider consequences of a cyber-incident.
A Code would also facilitate harmonization between a number of existing best practice
cybersecurity standards that are relevant to, but not explicitly targeted at, the maritime
sector, like the internationally-adopted US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) framework (NIST, 2018), which aims to standardize practices to ensure uniform pro-
tection of cyber assets. As these existing standards already have international acceptance,
compliance should meet less resistance from the IMO membership. Moreover, a single
Cyber Code document makes it easier to update regulations, since the IMO would be
able to more readily review and modernize regulations as new technology or processes
are introduced. Such a process was evident by the 2018 ‘e-waste’ amendments to the Mar-
itime Pollution Convention, which has acted to ensure the correct disposal of maritime
electrical equipment (IMO, 2018b).
Enabling enforcement
The creation of a Cyber Code would increase the ability to enforce cybersecurity regulation
from within the maritime industry itself. The Code would highlight the authority of auth-
orized members to carry out inspections to ensure the continued compliance with these
regulations. A vessel in breach of these regulations could be detained.
Enforcement authorities within the maritime industry, such as Flag Administrations and
Classification Societies, would be party to discussions about establishment of a Cyber
Code. This would provide the necessary leverage to develop a cohesive enforcement
structure. The Code would serve to create a framework for states to use entering regu-
lations into national law and in ensuring the consistency of these across the international
community and relevant third party stakeholders.
In 2017, the IMO amended two of their general security management codes to explicitly
include cybersecurity. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and
International Security Management Code (ISM) detail how port and ship operators
should conduct risk management processes. Making cybersecurity an integral part of
these processes should ensure that operators are at least conscious of cyber-risks.
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Hopefully, the above developments could initiate a more holistic approach to maritime
cybersecurity regulation. The knowledge gained from these new cyber-risk assessments
may enable the IMO to develop a broader set of cybersecurity regulations. Readily attain-
able is, for example, the harmonizing of some equipment requirements with existing
cybersecurity standards adopted by other sectors.
The inclusion of cyber risk management into both the ISM and ISPS security assess-
ments will allow administrations to have the enforcement capabilities required to
ensure compliance, and thus increase the security of maritime cyberspace. As part of a
Cyber Code these requirements are not left as standalone assessments, but would form
part of a wider assessment and mitigation process that includes compliance with other
standards and regulations, thus ensuring that all systems have a basic level of security.
There also seems to be a lack of urgency to get the house in order. It is also worth
noting that the cyber-specific amendments to the ISM and ISPS do not come into force
until January 1 2021 and they only represent starting point to move towards a more hol-
istic approach to maritime cybersecurity regulation.
Overcoming sovereign resistance
A Cyber Code would, like the IMO’s other Codes, have mandatory and voluntary com-
ponents. The mandatory section would include regulation that ensures the continued
safety and productivity of modern shipping. It would do this by drawing together the
expertise and combining this input with other existing regulations and standards. This
would ensure that the relevant parts of these other regulations are applicable to cyber
risk and are brought to the attention of stakeholders.
Many of the IMO regulations do not specify cyber-security principles but are broad
enough to be considered within them. This is similar to other sectors, for example by
the application of a modern understanding of cyber-security to traditional definitions of
broadcasting in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by the
Tallinn Manual 2.0 (NATO, 2017). In providing advice regarding the international law of
cyber operations,
… .understanding the points about which application and interpretation are subject to dispa-
rate views allows States to focus their efforts where clarification of the law is needed and in
their national interest. Such clarification will help deter other States from exploiting these
grey zones in the law of cyberspace (Schmitt, 2017).
Given a major obstacle is that maritime surveillance is strongly linked with national sover-
eignty, the voluntary section of the Code would allow the IMO to build in recommen-
dations that states could enact into national law. This combination of mandatory and
voluntary elements would allow minimum standards to be set by the mandatory
section, with additional security supplemented through the voluntary section. This volun-
tary section permits states to implement additional security in ways that they see fit, but
which might be seen as too prescriptive in other legal jurisdictions. By including these
regulation as voluntary, with no obligation to implement, states with reservations can
still agree to the Code, allowing it to enter into force.
As discussed previously, maritime cyberspace is closely connected to terrestrial infra-
structure, which falls under the individual sovereignty of states. Within IMO discussions,
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issues that are seen to infringe on state sovereignty, like submarine cabling, are often met
with resistance and outright rejection of the suggested regulation. Therefore, creating a
Cyber Code which is goal-based, a concept the IMO has utilized since the early 2000s,
could help overcome some of this resistance. This is because goal-based standards do
not specify a means of achieving compliance, but rather set flexible goals permitting
alternative ways to achieve compliance (Hoppe, 2005). This would allow sovereign
states the freedom to implement practices that fit in with their national guidance, as
long as the overall goal is met, and are included in operational security assessments, to
be assessed by the Flag Administration This would involve controlling checking all the
security navigation documentation and having direct control on the compliance of
foreign-registered vessels calling at domestic ports.
The establishment process of a cyber code
The IMO has currently made little progress in the creation of cybersecurity regulation,
as there has been only ad hoc attention paid to it within major policy discussions. In
2014, the IMO opened a cybersecurity discussion at a supranational level, by engaging
not only with its member states but also the broad spectrum of consultative Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations within its membership regarding cybersecurity regulations
and policies (IMO, 2014b). Yet the resulting cybersecurity guidelines, which act as a
precursor for regulation, addressed only a broad set of non-maritime specific cyber
risks.
Before a specific set of cybersecurity regulations, or dedicated Cyber Code, can be
formed more work is required to understand the cybersecurity risks faced by the maritime
industry. From previous experience, the IMO has a timeline for the establishment of a
Code. But is still a way to go before the sustainable creation of a Cyber Code occurs. Sig-
nificantly, it is often a specific newsworthy event, or disaster, which acts as a catalyst for
discussion and change within the IMO. It is through these discussions that the experience
and expertise present within the IMO’s membership help create a Code.
One such event was the sinking of the Titanic in 1912. The tragic loss of life was a cat-
alyst for the international maritime community to create a holistic set of regulations to
ensure the safety of life of both seafarers and passengers at sea. The discussion led to
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which has become
one of the single most significant conventions within the IMO relating to life saving appli-
ances and arrangements. The Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010 – the largest marine
oil spill in history – also led to the instigation of numerous amendments to IMO regulations
relating to oil spills because existing regulations had applied to tankers and not drilling
platforms (Smith, 2011).
Yet it would seem unlikely that an incident on the scale of the Titanic or Deepwater
Horizon is likely to arise from cyber threats to the maritime industry. The significant attack
on A.P. Moller-Maersk’s land-based systems in 2017 did not involve loss of life and operations
were restored within one week, although they suffered a $300 million loss in the relevant
financial quarter (Novet, 2017). Therefore, a better example for the establishment of a
Cyber code would be the sinking of the Polar passenger ship ‘The Explorer’ in 2007. The
sinking did not result in a catastrophic loss of life, however, the reaction of the maritime com-
munity, through the IMO, was the creation of the Polar Code (Basarn, 2015). Again, this
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addressed the unique challenge of strengthening existing conventions in a way where com-
pliance was only required by those who operated within that specific environment.
The process of a code creation
The blueprint for the establishment of a Code provided by the Polar Code does suggest a
three-phase process. Firstly, a threat or danger is formulated. Following this is a ‘nego-
tiation’ phase, which allows the IMO membership to come to a consensus regarding the
threats, the impacts and the subsequent management of that threat. The final stage is
the ratification of the Code, which embodies the agreement by IMO committees to the
regulations built from its members’ comments and opinions.
For cybersecurity, the formulation of the risk came in 2014, when the IMO engaged with
their membership to raise awareness of common cyber vulnerabilities on board existing
ships. This put cybersecurity on the Maritime Safety Committee’s agenda, which can be
seen as the first step towards establishment of a Cyber Code. This has occurred without
an obvious referent object or disaster that has commonly been the catalyst for regulatory
discussions
The second phase, the negotiation stage, started with the production of the IMOs
Interim Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management (IMO, 2016). Like the Circulars
which acted as the pre-curser to the Polar Code, it only contains recommendations,
with no binding and uniform acceptance (Bai, 2015). However, these allow all parties to
be able to influence the decision-making process ahead of ratification of regulation into
a formal Code. Yet more work is required to appreciate the growing cybersecurity risks
faced by the maritime industry before negotiations can continue.
As mentioned, in 2017, the IMO had highlighted the relevance of both the ISM Code
(IMO, 2018a) and the ISPS Code (IMO, 2012) within this negotiation phase. By including
cyber risk assessments as an integral part of the security certificate of compliance for
both port facilities and vessels, all operators are made aware of the risks that their
systems and processes represent, and are required to communicate this back to the IMO.
This process goes beyond a general understanding of the systems and possible threats
and must indirectly include mitigation measures contained in security plans. The IMO does
not suggest specific and definitive methods for mitigating cyber risk, but rather suggests
that organizations become more aware of the inherent vulnerabilities that their systems
and practices have, and design their own appropriate mitigation practices. This process
ensures that there is collaboration with all parties and practices that are in some way
invested with day-to-day maritime cyber-security, leading to a better-informed nego-
tiation phase.
For the third and final stage of the ratification of a Cyber Code to occur, there must be a
baseline agreement on the basic structure and content at a legal and technical level. This
basis for this would not need to be created from scratch, but rather, by utilizing Article 30
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (UN, 1980). So it would be formed from
other previous, legally binding conventions. This subsequent governance basis would be
supplemented by the additional outputs and decisions identified in the negotiation phase
and then eventually ratified by the IMO Assembly. It should be noted that before any con-
vention does come into force – that is, before it becomes binding upon governments
which have ratified it – it has to be accepted formally by individual governments.
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Overall, the bulk of the cyber-specific regulations that would be included in a Cyber
Code are directly formed from the initial information gained through ISM and ISPS assess-
ments. It can be argued that the voluntary incorporation of these assessments will form a
much better stimulant for development of a Code rather than being reactive and knee-
jerk. Instead, such an assessment process will allow the industry to utilize the strength
of its collective participants to develop comprehensive regulation based from best prac-
tice and not be reliant on intentions based from past experiences.
There is no inevitability that a Cyber Code will be created from this process. However, as
this research note has outlined, it would be the logical and productive step. Currently,
there does seem a trend from the maritime industry not to want a Cyber Code, but this
may come from the lack of appropriate risk management regime across shipping organ-
izations. With an increased clarity about applicable risk boundaries and the threats to
systems or services posed by digitization and integration, the industry might tap into
new opportunities to drive an international standard. This standard, in the form of a
Cyber Code, would then act to ensure a uniform and parallel approach is adopted while
increasing the cost and consequences of non-compliance.
Conclusion
The maritime industry is undoubtedly behind other transportation sectors, such as aero-
space, in cybersecurity terms. The co-operative establishment of a holistic Cyber Code
by the maritime community would allow the development of robust maritime cybersecur-
ity regulations. These would equip the sector with the capability and adaptability to
address whatever future cyber security challenges arise.
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